

ACIS - 1450/87
13 October 1987

NOTE FOR: DDCI
FROM: C/ACIS
SUBJECT: Possible Senior Arms Control Group Meeting

This is for your information and/or any guidance you may wish to provide.

We learned this morning from the NSC Staff that there will probably be a Senior Arms Control Group meeting this Friday afternoon. One of the topics to be discussed is how the USG structures itself to deal with on-site inspections. If we are to provide a position paper for the DCI on this topic, we must do so before noon Thursday. I understand that Kerr and Helgeson are waiting to discuss this matter with you. It would be very helpful if we could expedite the resolution of the OSI proposals we now have in hand.

If you require any additional information or support on this topic, please let me know.



cc: DDI
ADDI

STAT

~~SECRET~~Talking Points - INF Verification - 14 October 1987

25X1

1. We have spoken before here about our capabilities and uncertainties in monitoring Soviet compliance with INF.
2. We have tried to point out tradeoffs between negotiating positions and monitoring confidence.
3. One such tradeoff involves the current U.S. position that will allow the Soviets to retain the key infrastructure potentially enabling them much more easily to convert non-declared, covertly stored, extra SS-20 launchers and missiles into military forces in crisis or wartime, in at most a few weeks.

With the current U.S. position, the Soviets will be allowed to retain at SS-20 bases:

- all command control and communications elements.
 - all support systems for field deployments.
 - all SS-20 related military units.
4. Because of our large uncertainties, significant numbers of stored SS-20 launchers and missiles could remain, undetected.
 5. I hope that we can use the time ahead to reduce the risks and uncertainties inherent in some of these positions and that we not try to resolve such problems in a rush (or in Moscow).
 6. For example, we should examine explicit prohibitions on Soviets from operating bases, equipment, and people to maintain a supporting infrastructure for the SS-20. Such provisions, if effective, may reduce the Soviet incentive to cheat on nondeployed missiles by reducing their military significance. For example:
 - No operations or training related to SS-20 systems should be allowed.
 - The equipment and personnel associated with SS-20s should leave the bases.
 - Maintain a strong on-site inspection regime for these SS-20 bases.
 7. As concerned as I am with all of this in the context of an INF treaty, it is even more worrisome in terms of setting a bad precedent for strategic forces in START.

~~SECRET~~

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP89B00224R000501770001-6

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied